National Admissions Test for Law (LNAT)

Sample Test (May 2005)

The test has 2 separate sections, A and B.

Section A: Multiple Choice

This section is divided into 10 sub sections; each sub section has between 2 and 4 questions.

You should answer **all** 30 multiple choice questions in Section A, selecting **one** of the possible answers listed for each question.

Time allowed: 80 minutes

Section B: Essay

This section has 5 essay questions.

You should select and answer **one** question in Section B.

Time allowed: 40 minutes

Section A: Multiple Choice

Answer ALL of the following questions.

I Freedom

The words 'free' and 'freedom' are in many contexts emotional rather than meaningful words. They are useful for making rousing slogans: political slogans such as 'Set the people free'; educational slogans such as 'Give children more freedom'. A slogan was originally a Highland war-cry. Many people today are shouting out the battle-cry of freedom. Slogans have their uses; otherwise they would not be so popular, especially amongst advertisers and politicians. Educationists too need to rouse people, and they should not therefore despise the use of emotional words. But highly emotional words like 'freedom' should be used with an understanding of their meaning as well as with an appreciation of the power of their emotional overtones. They will then have power to arouse thought as well as emotion. The only real justification for the use of slogans, especially in education, is to stir people to think and act, not to stir them to act without thinking. There is a danger that classroom slogans like 'free activity' and 'free discipline' may lead to unthinking, unwise practice. It is necessary to consider carefully what the word 'freedom' means.

If it is to convey meaning with even a slight degree of precision it must be used with a preposition: 'freedom for' as in freedom for children or oppressed peoples; 'freedom from' as in freedom from want, fear or irritating interference; 'freedom in' as in freedom in education or the classroom; 'freedom of' as in freedom of action, conscience, opinion, speech, will or worship; and with a slightly different meaning in freedom of the library, of the city or of the seas.

The prepositions are to some extent interchangeable; most 'freedoms of' could, for example, be expressed as 'freedoms to'. There is, however, a clearer distinction between 'freedom from' and 'freedom to'; one is negative, the other positive. Negative kinds of freedom are important chiefly because they make positive kinds possible. Freedom from want and fear, for example, sets people free to do something, to be creative.

When the word 'freedom' is linked with prepositions it becomes clear that freedom is not a single entity; there are many freedoms.

Source:
Education: Some Fundamental Problems
A.G. Hughes and E.H. Hughes (Longman (Pearson Education), 1960)

1. What is the writer's **main** argument?

   (a) The word 'freedom' has different meanings.

   (b) Freedom in education is especially important.

   (c) 'Freedom to' is better than 'freedom from'.

   (d) Words such as 'freedom' should be used carefully.

   (e) 'Freedom' is a meaningless word.

2. Which of these do you think is an **assumption** by the writer?

   (a) People should think before they act.

   (b) There is no place for freedom in the classroom.

   (c) Slogans do not tell the truth.

   (d) Politicians and advertisers misuse slogans.

   (e) Prepositions are essential to meaning.

3. Which of these can **not** be inferred from the passage?

   (a) Education is different from other aspects of life.

   (b) People use words carelessly.

   (c) Education is an important section of society.

   (d) In education, theory and practice are linked.

   (e) Classroom discipline is important.

II The Problem of the Mutilated Chessboard

Science is operated according to the judicial system. A theory is assumed to be true if there is enough evidence to prove it 'beyond all reasonable doubt'. On the other hand mathematics does not rely on evidence from fallible experimentation, but it is built on infallible logic. This is demonstrated by the problem of the 'mutilated chessboard', illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1

We have a chessboard with the two opposing corners removed, so that there are only 62 squares remaining. Now we take 31 dominoes shaped such that each domino covers exactly two squares. The question is: is it possible to arrange the 31 dominoes so that they cover all the 62 squares on the chessboard?

There are two approaches to the problem:

1. The scientific approach

The scientist would try to solve the problem by experimenting, and after trying out a few dozen arrangements would discover that they all fail. Eventually the scientist believes that there is enough evidence to say that the board cannot be covered. However, the scientist can never be sure that this is truly the case because there might be some arrangement which has not been tried which might do the trick. There are millions of different arrangements and it is only possible to explore a small fraction of them. The conclusion that the task is impossible is a theory based on experiment, but the scientist will have to live with the prospect that one day the theory may be overturned.

2. The mathematical approach

The mathematician tries to answer the question by developing a logical argument which will derive a conclusion which is undoubtedly correct and which will remain unchallenged forever. One such argument is the following:

- The corners which were removed from the chessboard were both white. Therefore there are now 32 black squares and only 30 white squares.
- Each domino covers two neighbouring squares, and neighbouring squares are always different in colour, i.e. one black and one white.
- Therefore, no matter how they are arranged, the first 30 dominoes laid on the board must cover 30 white squares and 30 black squares.
- Consequently, this will always leave you with one domino and two black squares remaining.
- But remember all dominoes cover two neighbouring squares, and neighbouring squares are opposite in colour. However, the two squares remaining are the same colour and so they cannot both be covered by the one remaining domino. Therefore, covering the board is impossible!

This proof shows that every possible arrangement of dominoes will fail to cover the mutilated chessboard.

Source:
Fermat's Last Theorem
Simon Singh (Fourth Estate, 1997)

4. Which of the following can **not** be inferred from the analogy between the judicial system and science?

   (a) The judicial system relies on evidence.

   (b) The judicial system is not built on infallible logic.

   (c) The judicial system is fallible.

   (d) The judicial system always includes an element of doubt.

   (e) The judicial system does not work properly.

5. When the writer demonstrates the difference between the scientific approach and the mathematical approach, his **main** argument is:

   (a) Experiments can never reveal facts.

   (b) Theories are not very useful.

   (c) The scientific approach relies on evidence.

   (d) The mathematical approach shows that chess is a very logical game.

   (e) The judicial system ought to model itself on the mathematical approach, not the scientific.

6. Which of the following is **not** shown in this extract?

   (a) The scientific approach is less logical than the mathematical approach.

   (b) The mathematical approach is more logical than the scientific approach.

   (c) The mathematical approach doesn't rely on evidence.

   (d) Mathematical proofs can never be challenged.

   (e) The mathematical approach should always be used rather than the scientific approach.

III Politicians' Age

According to former Prime Minister Sir Edward Heath, Michael Howard's age is another reason to add to all the others that have made every Conservative Party leader after him unelectable.

'Today prime ministers are appointed in their forties,' he thundered. 'And I think a whole lot of the population won't recognise someone in their sixties as being a prime minister. Our purpose should be to have somebody there that generations lower down, the young people, can say, "He will understand what we want and produce it for us". It is very difficult to do that with somebody of a much greater age.'

There are so many bad arguments here that it's hard to know where to begin. But let's start with the notion that today prime ministers are appointed in their forties.

It's certainly true that the last two were in their forties when they were elected (not appointed). But has this completely changed the rules of the political game? After all, the previous Prime Minister was 53 when she entered No 10 and 65 when she left. Political choices more often follow a pendulum path than a continuous line. The relatively youthful Jimmy Carter was succeeded by the relatively elderly Ronald Reagan, and the 68 year old George Bush by the young Bill Clinton. It is just as likely that in a future election voters will decide that they prefer sagacity and experience to youthful vigour. Just as voters tend to get bored with one party after two or three parliamentary terms and swap it for another, they may get tired of one type of prime minister and go for the person who seems most unlike the incumbent.

Differentiation is often the key to election success. With both Tony Blair and Charles Kennedy younger than average, Howard's age could be an advantage. Being of another generation would give him more appeal to older voters.

And that leads me to Sir Edward's next solecism: the notion that a PM has to be someone with whom younger generations can identify. The over-45s not only make up half the electorate; they are also much more likely to turn out and vote than the young. And they are much more likely to turn out and vote Conservative.

If anything, William Hague's youth was a handicap at the last election. I lost count of the number of voters I canvassed who said they could not take him seriously. He seemed like an overgrown schoolboy, they said. They couldn't trust him to run the country wisely.

The sort of people who vote conservative are precisely the sort of person likely to value wisdom and maturity. If they are already old, they will

identify with Howard. If they are younger, they are more likely to have a deferential frame of mind.

Source:
Mary Ann Sieghart, The Times, London.

7. All of these are assertions of opinion **except:**

   (a) Michael Howard's age gives him more appeal to older voters.

   (b) Conservative voters value wisdom and maturity.

   (c) The over-45s make up half the electorate.

   (d) Voters tend to get bored with one party after two or three parliamentary terms.

   (e) William Hague's youth was a handicap at the last election.

8. What is the **main** argument the writer advances against Sir Edward Heath's view:

   (a) Conservative voters prefer an older leader.

   (b) Voters don't always go for young leaders.

   (c) Michael Howard is a contrast to other party leaders.

   (d) Margaret Thatcher was 65 when she left No 10.

   (e) Prime ministers are not appointed in their forties.

9. The writer's use of her own experience serves all of these purposes **except**:

   (a) to show she is a Conservative party member

   (b) to show she knows about the subject

   (c) to show that only older politicians are successful

   (d) to give a specific example to the reader

   (e) to show that youthfulness is not necessarily appealing

IV Prescriptive Language

If we were to ask of a person 'What are his moral principles?' the way in which we could be most sure of a true answer would be by studying what he did. He might, to be sure, profess in his conversation all sorts of principles, which in his actions he completely disregarded; but it would be when, knowing all the relevant facts of a situation, he was faced with choices or decisions between alternative courses of action, between alternative answers to the question 'What shall I do?', that he would reveal in what principles of conduct he really believed. The reason why actions are in a peculiar way revelatory of moral principles is that the function of moral principles is to guide conduct. The language of morals is one sort of prescriptive language. And this is what makes ethics worth studying: for the question 'What shall I do?' is one that we cannot for long evade; the problems of conduct, though sometimes less diverting than crossword puzzles, have to be solved in a way that crossword puzzles do not. We cannot wait to see the solution in the next issue, because on the solution of the problems depends what happens in the next issue. Thus, in a world in which the problems of conduct become every day more complex and tormenting, there is a great need for an understanding of the language in which these problems are posed and answered. For confusion about our moral language leads, not merely to theoretical muddles, but to needless practical perplexities.

An old fashioned, but still useful, way of studying anything is 'per genus et differentiam'; if moral language belongs to the genus 'prescriptive language', we shall most easily understand its nature if we compare and contrast first of all prescriptive language with other sorts of language, and then moral language with other sorts of prescriptive language.

Source:
The Language of Morals
R.M. Hare (Oxford University Press, 1952)
By permission of Oxford University Press

10. The comparison with solving a crossword puzzle implies or states all of the following in the argument **except**:

    (a) Solving crosswords can be enjoyable.

    (b) We can't put off ethical problems.

    (c) Solving crosswords is easier than problems of conduct.

    (d) Solving a problem of conduct affects our actions, unlike solving a crossword.

    (e) Doing crossword puzzles is a waste of time.

11. By 'per genus et differentiam', the writer means:

    (a) Prescriptive language is different from moral language.

    (b) Prescriptive language is the same as moral language.

    (c) Moral language is only one kind of prescriptive language.

    (d) Prescriptive language is only one kind of moral language.

    (e) Moral language includes prescriptive language.

12. Which of the following is an **unstated** assumption of the writer?

    (a) Moral questions get more complex all the time.

    (b) Language and ethics are related.

    (c) We know what someone's moral principles are because of the way they behave.

    (d) We ought to be concerned with ethical issues.

    (e) People's actions do not always reflect their words.

V The ‘Chinese Encyclopedia’

Subjects – or more formally ‘disciplines’ – can seem like pigeonholes into which everything in the world is carefully placed. It’s as if we have divided the world into encyclopedia entries and each entry has to have a discipline of its own; that way we can be sure that everything we know about is being studied by someone. If you were to look up animal, for instance, you would be led to zoology, the study of animals. If you went on to look up horse or dog, you would end up with the special branches of zoology that study horses and dogs.

But consider this account of a fictional ‘Chinese encyclopedia’ by the Argentinean writer Jorge Luis Borges (1899–1986):

Animals are divided into:

(a) belonging to the Emperor
(b) embalmed
(c) tame
(d) sucking pigs
(e) sirens
(f) fabulous
(g) stray dogs
(h) included in the present classification
(i) frenzied
(j) innumerable
(k) drawn with a very fine camel hair brush
(l) et cetera
(m) having just broken the water pitcher
(n) that from a long way off look like flies

This list might look like a joke, but it asks some difficult questions. For example, why do we find it funny? Because it seems so random? Certainly it offers a very different form of classification of animals from the encyclopedias on most of our library shelves and follows no basic organising principle that we recognise. And if every entry has a corresponding discipline, what would these be? From-a-long-way-off-looks-like-flies-ology, perhaps, or Stray-dography. This looks like nonsense to us: our ‘normal’ encyclopedias use certain rules to select their entries and the corresponding disciplines seem to be far more sensible as a result. Because we are taking too much for granted? How can it be that if only our criteria and rules are valid? If you had learned about the world through this fictional ‘Chinese encyclopedia’, Stray-dography would make perfect sense, just as zoology does to us. This ‘absurd’ system makes us realise that although our system seems logical and natural, it too is made by people and therefore artificial. We use conventions to divide up our world, but really the world doesn’t have set categories. Subjects aren’t natural either; we invent them by dividing ‘knowledge’ up in a way that suits our view of the world.

All of this suggests that disciplines are not just ways of studying things that already exist. Rather the categories we take for granted and the disciplines that study them are constructed and reflect the world-view of those who construct them.

Source:
Doing English
Robert Eaglestone (Routledge, 2000)

13. Which of these comes **nearest** to the reasons for the writer's use of inverted commas:

    (a) because he wants to emphasise the words

    (b) because he has used the words incorrectly

    (c) because they are quotations

    (d) because he is drawing the reader's attention to the way we normally use the words

    (e) because the words are being used colloquially

14. The writer uses the example of the 'Chinese encyclopedia' in order to argue:

    (a) There is no point in dividing knowledge up into subjects.

    (b) There is no natural way to categorise knowledge.

    (c) It's impossible to classify knowledge.

    (d) There is no such thing as knowledge.

    (e) We should learn more about how others view the world.

15. The **main** argument in the last paragraph is:

    (a) Categories should be natural not artificial.

    (b) Disciplines vary in different times and cultures.

    (c) We classify knowledge because of our existing ideas.

    (d) We shouldn't take knowledge for granted.

    (e) We ought to be aware of how others categorise the world.

VI The Stories of English

Books about the history of the English language come in two main varieties. First, there are the traditional textbooks: written by scholars and read mainly by undergraduates, these tend to be dry compilations of facts about loan words, vowel shifts and the levelling of inflections. Then there is the popularising tradition inaugurated in the mid-1980s with the book of the TV series 'The Story of English'. Aimed at a non-specialist audience and written most often by celebrity amateurs, this genre cuts through the philological minutiae to tell the inspiring tale of the obscure Germanic dialect which transcended its humble origins to become a global lingua franca used by more people in more parts of the world than any other language in history.

I was expecting David Crystal's 'The Stories of English' to be a hybrid of the two types, combining the narrative appeal of the popular story with the detailed linguistic knowledge one would expect from the editor of the 'Cambridge Encyclopaedia of Language'. In fact it turns out to be something far more interesting: an attempt to give the story of English a new twist.

The distinctive feature of Crystal's approach is indicated by the plural of his title: 'stories' rather than 'story'. The familiar narrative traces the history of the standard language; the one presented here, by contrast, interweaves that standard story with the stories of other, non-standard dialects. 'The other stories,' Crystal declares, 'have never been given their rightful place in English linguistic history, and it is time they were.' Here it might be objected that dialect diversity is a staple ingredient of the popular formula: television versions in particular would be incomplete without the obligatory parade of Scottish fisherfolk, Cumbrian shepherds, Appalachian farmers and Caribbean market traders. But their usual role is to add a touch of decorative local colour, like pearly kings and queens popping up during a tour of Buckingham Palace. Crystal's more ambitious goal is to integrate them into the main historical narrative.

This move not only complicates the story itself, it also produces a dramatically different meta-narrative. Whereas the conventional story is a narrative of progress, and tends to Panglossian optimism – all is for the best in this best of all possible languages - Crystal's version is more of a meditation on riches lost, or squandered, and then rediscovered. In the beginning, he explains, was diversity, which for centuries was accepted and indeed celebrated by our greatest writers. When Chaucer made the two students in the Reeve's tale northern speakers, this was not a way of downgrading their status or poking fun at them, but simply a way of portraying them more vividly as individuals. Shakespeare followed Chaucer in reserving his satire for those who spoke English pretentiously rather than those who merely spoke it differently: 'different' had not yet come to mean 'deficient'. But the process of codifying a standard for English brought with it a devaluation of diversity.

From the 18th century to the late 20th, English was ruled by the pedantry and snobbery of authorities who tried to impose on everyone the norms of their own elite group. But recently, Crystal argues, a new wisdom has prevailed. From Edinburgh to Cape Town and from New York to Singapore, literature in non-standard Englishes is flourishing once again; all kinds of English accents can be heard on radio and television; schoolchildren following the national curriculum are encouraged to analyse what their predecessors were taught to stigmatise. 'Disgusted of Tunbridge Wells' may continue to fight a rearguard action against misplaced apostrophes and wandering word stress, but such prescriptive intolerance is no longer typical. Diversity is now seen once again for what it is and always has been – the heart and soul of the language.

Source: © Deborah Cameron, The Guardian, 5 June 2004

16. The writer argues that David Crystal's book gives a 'new twist' to the story of English because:

    (a) It doesn't give a chronological account of the language.

    (b) It has more focus on different kinds of language use.

    (c) It is more pessimistic.

    (d) It gives fewer examples.

    (e) It is a more complex account.

17. The writer suggests that all of these are parts of David Crystal's argument **except**:

    (a) 'The other stories have never been given their rightful place in English linguistic history, and it is time they were.'

    (b) 'a dramatically different meta-narrative'

    (c) 'riches lost, or squandered, and then rediscovered'

    (d) 'a devaluation of diversity'

    (e) 'literature in non-standard Englishes is flourishing once again'

18. According to the writer, the **main** reason David Crystal uses the example of Chaucer's two northern students is:

    (a) Northern speech was not seen as funny in Chaucer's time.

    (b) Attitudes to dialect and accent have changed since Chaucer's time.

    (c) Particular accents and dialects conveyed prestige in Chaucer's time.

    (d) Chaucer had other targets for his satire.

    (e) Northern speech was of high status in Chaucer's time.

VII Punishment

The subject of punishment, in the sense of attaching legal penalties to the violation of legal rules, has always been a troubling moral question. The trouble about it has not been that people disagree as to whether or not punishment is justifiable. Most people have held that, freed from certain abuses, it is an acceptable institution. Only a few have rejected punishment entirely, which is rather surprising when one considers all that can be said against it. The difficulty is with the justification of punishment: various arguments for it have been given by moral philosophers, but so far none of them has won any sort of general acceptance; no justification is without those who detest it.

For our purposes we may say that there are two justifications for punishment. What we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing. That a criminal should be punished follows from his guilt, and the severity of the appropriate punishment depends on the depravity of his act. The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally better than the state of affairs where he does not; and it is better irrespective of any of the consequences of punishing him.

What we may call the utilitarian view holds that on the principle that bygones are bygones and that only future consequences are material to present decisions, punishment is justifiable only by reference to the probable consequences of maintaining it as one of the devices of social order. Wrongs committed in the past are, as such, not relevant considerations for deciding what to do. If punishment can be shown to promote effectively the interest of society, it is justifiable, otherwise it is not.

I have stated these two competing views very roughly to make one feel the conflict between them: one feels the force of both arguments and one wonders how they can be reconciled. From my introductory remarks it is obvious that the resolution which I am going to propose is that in this case one must distinguish between justifying a practice as a system of rules to be applied and enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls under these rules; utilitarian arguments are appropriate with regard to questions about practices, while retributive arguments fit the application of particular rules to particular cases.

We might try to get clear about this distinction by imagining how a father might answer the question of his son. Suppose the son asks, 'Why was J put in jail yesterday?' The father answers, 'Because he robbed a bank at B. He was duly tried and found guilty. That's why he was put in jail yesterday'. But suppose the son had asked a different question, namely, 'Why do people put other people in jail?' Then the father might answer, 'To protect good

people from bad people' or 'To stop people from doing things that would make it uneasy for all of us; for otherwise we wouldn't be able to go to bed at night and sleep in peace'. There are two very different questions here. One question emphasises the proper name: it asks why J was punished rather than someone else, or it asks what he was punished for. The other question asks why we have the institution of punishment: why do people punish one another rather than, say, always forgiving one another?

Source:
Philosophical Review, Vol.64 (1955)
reprinted by permission of John Rawls and the Philosophical Review

19. What does the writer suggest is the **main** reason punishment is a 'troubling moral question'?

    (a) We don't all agree that punishment is necessary.

    (b) We don't always know what the consequences of punishment might be.

    (c) We can't always decide on an appropriate punishment for a violation of the law.

    (d) We don't all agree on the reasons for punishment.

    (e) We don't know whether punishment is good for society as a whole.

20. All of the following are argued about retributive and utilitarian views of punishment **except**:

    (a) Utilitarianism does not directly link an act to its punishment.

    (b) It is possible to reconcile retributive and utilitarian views of punishment.

    (c) Retributive views look at the wider implications of punishment for society as a whole.

    (d) Utilitarianism thinks society as a whole is more important than the actions of an individual.

    (e) Retributive views state that it is right to make the punishment fit the crime.

21. The **main** function of the example in the last paragraph is:

(a) to show that we argue differently when it comes to personal matters

(b) to show that punishment is an important part of society

(c) to show the distinction between two kinds of theories

(d) to show what happens when we apply general rules to particular cases

(e) to show that punishment is more important than forgiveness

VIII The Canon

The impact of the canon on all our perceptions is perhaps most striking when we reflect how quickly and how totally it changed posterity's understanding of the two literary generations before its acceptance. In the age of Adam Smith, large numbers of general readers were able to buy or borrow books for the first time. The novels and plays offered to these new readers were often quotidian in their concerns, and direct, non-specialised in their vocabulary and range of allusion. Many authors were women; some of the best poets, we might now agree – like Burns and Blake – came from the ranks. Nineteenth-century professionals, journalists and academics, made great writers into an officer class, and imposed restrictions on the entry of women and NCOs. The canon came to look harmonious rather than contentious; learned or polite rather than artless or common; national rather than provincial or sectarian on the one hand, or dispersed and international on the other. Literature is individualistic or pluralist; words such as 'canon' or 'heritage' impose a uniformity that had some practical advantages, especially at the outset, but was always artificial.

The Victorian canon must have been made for the 'general reader', more for consumption at home than in the classroom, since the process of canon-making clearly pre-dates the rise of English Literature as a school and university subject. By the second half of the nineteenth century, the era of mass secondary education, syllabus reform and the provision of academic school and university places for women, English Literature was so wholesome a field of study that its social utility was easy to argue for. Victorians, notable for their hard-headedness, saw the merits of a school subject that delivered the nation's traditions to pupils in an inspiring, unifying and easily digested form. On the most practical level, it provided models for using the language, most universal of skills in advanced society; it opened the door to experience, personal and social, in the adult world. Given the large and steadily increasing numbers of women studying the subject, the supply of teachers was unlikely to run short. All these arguments still prevail, and are being rehearsed again in Britain as a reforming government strives for an education system which will deliver, among other things, a mentally disciplined, trainable workforce. But what will the content of that school literature syllabus be? Must it still resemble the Victorian conception, simply because the Victorian conception is there?

The nature of the population has, after all, changed a great deal in a century. It is now more urbanised and more ethnically diverse, and many of the non-formal aspects of its culture are new (radio, television, film, tabloid newspapers, sport). The adult work required of the populace in the twenty-first century will be very different from that required in the nineteenth. Without an empire to hold down, there seems less point in schooling young males in hearty nationalism (though many believers in educational reform still seem very keen on breeding patriots). There is, on the other hand, a valuable social lesson just as cogently drawn from studying past literature,

that of learning to understand and tolerate the other person's position. Most literature does not speak for the official, London-based 'nation'. It expresses the view of a sect, a province, a gender, a class, bent more often than not on criticism or outright opposition. For literary purposes, the British Isles have always been what the Australian poet Les Murray recently termed in the present day, 'the Anglo-Celtic archipelago'. As a social institution, literature models an intricate, diverse, stressful community, not a bland monolith.

Source:
Repossessing the Past
Marilyn Butler (Blackwell Publishing, 1989)

22. Which of these phrases is being used **ironically**:

    (a) 'Nineteenth-century professionals, journalists and academics, made great writers into an officer class'

    (b) 'English Literature was so wholesome a field of study'

    (c) 'Victorians, notable for their hard-headedness'

    (d) 'Must it still resemble the Victorian conception, simply because the Victorian conception is there?'

    (e) 'though many believers in educational reform still seem very keen on breeding patriots'

23. The extended metaphor in the first paragraph is being used **mainly** to suggest what about nineteenth-century attitudes to literature and the 'canon':

    (a) They excluded women.

    (b) They excluded the working classes.

    (c) They made the idea of literature too artificial.

    (d) They made the idea of literature too unvaried.

    (e) They made literature into a professional study.

IX The Intelligent Computer

Some claim that computers are mere manipulators of information, unable to understand the information they manipulate. The philosopher John Searle devised the analogy of the Chinese room to illustrate such an argument. The Chinese room has no windows and no doors. Its only opening is a narrow slit through which questions written on a slip of paper in Chinese may be passed into the room. Shortly after a question is passed through the slit, an intelligent answer, again written on a slip of paper in Chinese, is passed back out of the room. The room is occupied by a human who does not understand the Chinese language. Whenever he receives a question, he analyses the Chinese characters according to a comprehensive set of instructions written in a language he does understand. For every possible question, the instructions indicate whereabouts on the countless shelves in the room the slip of paper giving an appropriate answer may be found. By following the instructions, the human appears intelligent enough to provide an intelligent answer to any question. But because he does not understand Chinese, he has no understanding whatsoever either of the questions or the answers. Searle compares the Chinese room to a computer. He suggests that by following the instructions provided by its programmer, a computer may appear to be intelligent, but in fact it has no grasp at all of the information it processes. …

I reject Searle's argument that computers could not be made to understand the information they manipulate. The analogy of the Chinese room is confused. Searle views a computer as separate from the instructions provided by its programmer, in the same way as the human in the Chinese room is separate from the instructions with which he is provided. In fact, a computer is defined by its instructions; indeed, a computer is incapable of manipulating information, let alone understanding information, without instructions. The computer must be compared not to the human inside the Chinese room, but to the room as a whole, instructions included, and at this point Searle's analogy breaks down. A computer cannot be considered to 'contain' an intelligent being in the same way as the Chinese room contains the human, any more than the human brain can be considered in this way. As I will argue in the chapter on consciousness, any conception of the human brain that considers it to 'contain' an intelligent being is misconceived. Searle further seems to consider the only way in which a computer can manipulate information is by following comprehensive instructions that specify an appropriate response to every possible stimulus (or, to persist with the analogy of the Chinese room, an appropriate answer to every possible question). As I will argue in the chapter on intelligence, a computer programmed in such a way would indeed be incapable of understanding. But computers could be made to manipulate information in far more flexible ways than this.

Source:
The Human Computer
Mark Jeffery (by kind permission of Little, Brown and Company, 1999,
imprint of Time Warner Books UK)

24. The **main** point of John Searle's analogy of the Chinese room is:

(a) The information is inside the room.

(b) Information is searched.

(c) The language is not understood.

(d) Information is put in.

(e) A relevant answer is given out.

25. According to the writer, the **main** reason the analogy breaks down is:

(a) The human brain does not contain intelligence within it.

(b) A human brain does not need instructions.

(c) A computer cannot be separated from its instructions.

(d) A computer needs human input to work.

(e) A human brain does not process information.

26. Which of the following is **not** a possible description of the writer's views on the nature of human intelligence inferred from this passage:

(a) creative

(b) flexible

(c) adaptable

(d) knowledgeable

(e) independent

X Retirement Ages

The headlines will have caused many millions of older workers to shudder. Yesterday's front-page splash in 'The Times' declared 'Treasury will cash in as we all work to 70 - £10 bn late retirement windfall'. This was a follow-up to what was purported to be a 'Sunday Times' front-page exclusive that declared 'Work till you're 70 plan leaked'. Both are spurious overblown stories. No one is being forced to work beyond the current retirement age of 65. Indeed, almost half of British people are no longer in work by then. At the last count some 45% of British people aged between 55 and 65 were no longer in work.

What ministers are examining – and have been openly consulting about for the last 18 months – is what should happen when the European Union's directive requiring the UK to end its compulsory retirement age of 65 comes into effect in November 2006. The move is part of an exemplary wider EU drive to curb discrimination in the field of employment on three new grounds – age, sexual orientation and religion. Ministers have made it clear that the state pension age will remain at the current rate of 65 for men – with 65 being phased in for women by 2020 under a 1995 act. All those who want to claim their pensions at 65 will be able to. What is at issue is whether as Age Concern and Help the Aged have coherently argued, there should be no set age at which people should be required to retire or whether, as the CBI wants, there should be a compulsory retirement age at 70.

There are two separate arguments for abolishing a compulsory retirement age. The first is economic. For a succession of decades the amount of time people spent in work (due to extended education) and earlier retirement (forced or voluntary) has been shrinking. For an increasing number of people it has been crudely one third of life in each category. This has not been good for the economy. Loss of output and tax from large numbers of people between 50 and 65 not in work has been estimated at up to £30 bn a year. Now, as the workforce gets even older, there is a danger of an even more severe labour shortage. Yet research suggests that a rise of one third of 1% in the number of workers aged 50 to 69 could cover the cost of the new demographic challenge.

The second argument, the social reason, was set out by Michael Young, the social entrepreneur, 15 years ago. He pointed to the paradox of a society that had done so much to reduce the injury inflicted by biological ageing, but done so little to prevent the injury of social ageing. Ageing does not occur at a uniform rate. Look at Alan Greenspan, just reappointed chair of the US Federal Reserve at 78; or Alfred Brendel, the pianist, still performing at 73; or football – not just Sir Bobby Robson (70), but Otto Baric, the 71-year-old coach guiding Croatia in Euro 2004. Yet, in all too many occupations, people have been discarded at a set age. The EU has rightly insisted this discrimination must end.

Source:

27. What is the **main** point being made by the use of the examples in the last paragraph?

    (a) The men named all work in occupations with no compulsory retirement age.

    (b) The men named demonstrate that it is possible to work productively past the normal retirement age.

    (c) The men named show that the economy benefits when not everyone retires at 65.

    (d) The men named show that everyone should work until they are at least 70.

    (e) The men named show that if everyone worked longer there need not be a labour shortage.

28. Which of the following statements comes **closest** to an explanation of the 'new demographic challenge'?

    (a) Too many people are staying longer in education.

    (b) Men and women currently retire at different ages.

    (c) People are retiring too early.

    (d) People are not spending enough of their lives in work.

    (e) People are being forced to retire when they would rather carry on working.

29. Which of the following is an **assertion of opinion** rather than a statement of fact?

    (a) 'Loss of output and tax from large numbers of people between 50 and 65 not in work has been estimated at up to £30 bn a year.'

    (b) 'All those who want to claim their pensions at 65 will be able to.'

    (c) 'The EU has rightly insisted this discrimination must end.'

    (d) 'For an increasing number of people it has been crudely one third of life in each category.'

    (e) 'At the last count some 45% of British people aged between 55 and 65 were no longer in work.'

30. All of the following words and phrases suggest **approval** except:

    (a) 'have been openly consulting about for the last 18 months'

    (b) 'The move is part of an exemplary wider EU drive'

    (c) 'Age Concern and Help the Aged have coherently argued'

    (d) 'Ageing does not occur at a uniform rate.'

    (e) 'The EU has rightly insisted this discrimination must end.'

Section B: Essay

Answer ONE of the following questions.

Your answer should be a reasoned and substantiated argument which justifies your response to the question.

You may use one sheet of paper for planning your essay.

Your essay must be no longer than 4 pages.

1. Sport is 'war minus the shooting'. Do you agree?

2. What is your response to the view that the purpose of education is to prepare young people for the world of work?

3. 'Women now have the chance to achieve anything they want.'

   How do you respond to this statement?

4. 'Modern society is too dependent on debt: we should all pay our way.'

   Do you agree?

5. Would you agree that travel and tourism exploit poorer nations and benefit only the richer ones?